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Abstract—Wireless surveillance is becoming increasingly im-
portant to protect the public security by legitimately eaves-
dropping suspicious wireless communications. This paper studies
the wireless surveillance of a two-hop suspicious communication
link by a half-duplex legitimate monitor. By exploring the
suspicious link’s two-hop nature, the monitor can adaptively
choose among the following three eavesdropping modes to im-
prove the eavesdropping performance: (I) passive eavesdropping
to intercept both hops to decode the message collectively, (II)
proactive eavesdropping via noise jamming over the first hop, and
(III) proactive eavesdropping via hybrid jamming over the second
hop. In both proactive eavesdropping modes, the (noise/hybrid)
jamming over one hop is for the purpose of reducing the end-to-
end communication rate of the suspicious link and accordingly
making the interception more easily over the other hop. Under
this setup, we maximize the eavesdropping rate at the monitor
by jointly optimizing the eavesdropping mode selection as well
as the transmit power for noise and hybrid jamming. Numerical
results show that the eavesdropping mode selection significantly
improves the eavesdropping rate as compared to each individual
eavesdropping mode.
Index Terms—Wireless surveillance, two-hop communications,
proactive eavesdropping, noise jamming, hybrid jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of infrastructure-free wireless communica-
tions networks (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) commu-
nications [1]) brings new threads to public security, as they
may be misused by criminals or terrorists to commit crimes
or launch terror attacks [2]. To detect and stop such misuse,
there is a growing need for authorized parties to surveil them
via legitimate eavesdropping [3]–[6] and intervene in them via
legitimate jamming and spoofing [7], [8]. This introduces a
paradigm shift from the conventional secrecy communications
[9] (defending against eavesdropping [10]–[12], jamming, and
spoofing [13]) to the new wireless surveillance and interven-
tion legitimately exploiting these attacks [2].
In the literature, there have been several prior works [3]–
[6] investigating the wireless surveillance of a point-to-point
suspicious communication link from Alice (suspicious trans-
mitter) to Bob (suspicious receiver) via a legitimate monitor.
Conventionally, the monitor employs passive eavesdropping to
intercept the communicated message. This method, however,
is difficult to overhear effectively when the monitor is located
far away from Alice. To overcome this issue, the authors in
[3], [4] proposed proactive eavesdropping via noise jamming
by enabling the monitor to operate in a full-duplex mode.
J. Xu is the corresponding author.
In this method, the monitor sends artificial noise (AN) to
interfere with the Bob receiver, reduce its received signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) and the communication
rate, thus facilitating the eavesdropping at the same time.
As full-duplex radios are employed, this method requires
the monitor to efficiently cancel the self-interference (SI)
from its jamming to eavesdropping antennas. Furthermore,
the authors in [5] proposed proactive eavesdropping via hy-
brid jamming, where the full-duplex monitor forwards its
overheard message from Alice combined with an AN. At
the Bob receiver, the forwarded message by the monitor is
destructively added with the original message from Alice to
reduce Bob’s received signal strength, while the AN increases
its received interference power. As a result, hybrid jamming
can more effectively reduce Bob’s received SINR (and the
communication rate) than noise jamming, and therefore can
help achieve better eavesdropping performance. Nevertheless,
hybrid jamming is more difficult to be implemented, since the
monitor not only needs to perform the SI cancellation (SIC),
but also requires instantaneous message forwarding to ensure
the two messages’ destructive combining at the Bob receiver,
which is technically challenging due to hardware constraints
and channel acquisition.
In practice, like most infrastructure-free wireless communi-
cations, the suspicious communication is likely to be operated
in a multi-hop manner to extend the communication range.
This motivates us to investigate new surveillance approaches
by exploiting such a multi-hop nature to improve the eaves-
dropping performance. For example, the monitor can perform
passive eavesdropping over multiple hops to intercept more
than one copy of the suspicious message for overhearing
more clearly. Furthermore, by noting the fact that the end-
to-end communication rate of a multi-hop communication is
highly dependent on the SINR of each individual hop, the
monitor can reap the benefit of proactive eavesdropping in
a half-duplex way, by jamming over one hop to reduce the
end-to-end communication rate for intercepting more easily
over another hop. Such half-duplex proactive eavesdropping
efficiently eliminates the high requirements of SIC and instan-
taneous message forwarding in prior works with full-duplex
monitors.
For the purpose of initial investigation, we consider the
wireless surveillance of a simplified two-hop suspicious com-
munication link via a half-duplex legitimate monitor, where
the monitor aims to eavesdrop the suspicious message com-
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Fig. 1. A wireless surveillance scenario, where a monitor aims to legitimately eavesdrop a two-hop suspicious communication link from Alice to Bob through
a relay.
municated from Alice to Bob through a relay. By explor-
ing the suspicious link’s two-hop nature, the monitor can
adaptively choose among the following three eavesdropping
modes to improve the eavesdropping performance: (I) passive
eavesdropping to intercept both hops to decode the message
collectively, (II) proactive eavesdropping via noise jamming
over the first hop, and (III) proactive eavesdropping via hybrid
jamming over the second hop. Note that due to the message
causality issue, in mode (II), only noise jamming is feasible
at the first hop as the suspicious message is not overheard
yet; while in mode (III), more advanced hybrid jamming is
implementable at the second hop by exploiting the overheard
signal at the first hop. Under this setup, we maximize the
eavesdropping rate at the monitor by jointly optimizing the
eavesdropping mode selection as well as the transmit power
for noise and hybrid jamming. Numerical results show that
the eavesdropping mode selection significantly improves the
eavesdropping rate as compared to each individual eavesdrop-
ping mode under both fixed and time-varying channels.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider the wireless surveillance problem
as shown in Fig. 1, where a legitimate monitor aims to
eavesdrop a two-hop suspicious communication link from
Alice to Bob. The communication link goes through a half-
duplex and decode-and-forward (DF) relay for extending the
communication range between Alice and Bob. We consider a
block-based flat fading channel model, where wireless chan-
nels remain unchanged over a time block of our interest. Let
hAR, hRB, hAM, hMR, hRM, and hMB denote the channel
coefficients from Alice to the relay, from the relay to Bob,
from Alice to the monitor, from the monitor to the relay,
from the relay to the monitor, and from the monitor to Bob,
respectively. It is assumed that the suspicious users (Alice,
the relay, and Bob) only know the channel state information
(CSI) of their suspicious links (i.e., hAR and hRB), and they
use fixed transmit powers but can adaptively adjust the end-
to-end communication rate based on the SINRs of both hops.
The monitor practically operates in a half-duplex manner to
overhear the suspicious communication. It is assumed that the
monitor knows the global CSI of hAR, hRB, hAM, hMR, hRM,
and hMB. This assumption is made to characterize the funda-
mental performance limits of the legitimate eavesdropping in
this case, and our design is extendible to the practical learning-
based monitor without knowing the perfect CSI initially as
in [4]. By exploring the two-hop nature of the suspicious
communication, the half-duplex monitor can operate in the
following three eavesdropping modes, respectively.
A. Mode (I): Passive Eavesdropping over Both Hops
In mode (I), as shown in Fig. 1(a), the monitor combines the
overheard suspicious information from both hops for collective
eavesdropping. Consider first the suspicious communication.
In the first hop, let s and PA denote Alice’s transmit suspicious
message and the fixed transmit power, respectively. Here, s
is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random
variable with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., s ∼ CN (0, 1).
The received signal at the relay is yR =
√
PAhARs + n1,
where n1 ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at the relay receiver. After the relay decodes
the suspicious message s, in the second hop it uses the same
codebook to send s to Bob by using the fixed transmit power
PR. The received signal at Bob is yB =
√
PRhRBs+n2, where
n2 ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes the AWGN at the Bob receiver. In
the two hops, the received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at
the relay and Bob are denoted as γR =
|hAR|
2PA
σ2
and γB =
|hRB|
2PR
σ2
, and the corresponding achievable rates (in bps/Hz)
are respectively
rR =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
|hAR|2PA
σ2
)
, (1)
rB =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
|hRB|2PR
σ2
)
, (2)
where 12 indicates that each hop occupies only a half of
the normalized time-frequency slot. The end-to-end suspicious
communication rate is given as min (rR, rB).
In the two hops, the monitor passively overhears the suspi-
cious message from Alice and the relay, respectively, where
the received signals are yM1 =
√
PAhAMs + n3 and yM2 =√
PRhRMs+ n4 with n3 ∼ CN (0, σ2) and n4 ∼ CN (0, σ2).
By employing the maximum ratio combining (MRC) to decode
s, the SNR and the achievable rate at the monitor in mode (I)
are respectively γ
(I)
M =
PA|hAM|
2+PR|hRM|
2
σ2
and
r
(I)
M =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
PA|hAM|2 + PR|hRM|2
σ2
)
, (3)
where the superscripts of γ
(I)
M and r
(I)
M represent mode (I).
Now, we formally define the eavesdropping rate at the mon-
itor. Similarly as in [3]–[5], when the achievable rate r
(I)
M at
the monitor is no smaller than the end-to-end suspicious com-
munication rate min (rR, rB), the monitor can successfully
decode the suspicious message without any error. In this case,
the eavesdropping rate is defined as R
(I)
eav = min (rR, rB).
Otherwise, if r
(I)
M is smaller than min (rR, rB), the monitor
cannot decode the suspicious message without errors and the
eavesdropping rate is R
(I)
eav = 0. Thus, the eavesdropping rate
in the passive eavesdropping mode is defined as:
R(I)eav =
{
min (rR, rB) , if r
(I)
M ≥ min (rR, rB) ,
0, otherwise.
(4)
Note that R
(I)
eav is constant under fixed transmit power PA at
Alice and PR at the relay.
B. Mode (II): Proactive Eavesdropping via Noise Jamming
over the First Hop
In mode (II), as shown in Fig. 1(b), the monitor jams the
relay receiver via AN in the first hop to reduce the suspicious
communication rate for facilitating the eavesdropping from the
relay transmitter in the second hop. In the first hop, let x1 ∼
CN (0, 1) and Q1 denote the jamming signal (AN) and its
power at the monitor, respectively, where the subscripts of
x1 and Q1 indicate the first hop. In this jamming case, the
received signal at the relay in the first hop is denoted as y˜R =√
PAhARs+
√
Q1hMRx1 +n1. Accordingly, the SINR at the
relay reduces to γ˜R(Q1) =
|hAR|
2PA
|hMR|2Q1+σ2
and the achievable
rate is
r˜R(Q1) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
|hAR|2PA
|hMR|2Q1 + σ2
)
. (5)
In the second hop, similarly as in mode (I), the achievable
rate at Bob is equal to rB in (2). Accordingly, the end-to-end
suspicious communication rate is min (r˜R(Q1), rB).
At the half-duplex monitor, as it can only eavesdrop the
suspicious message from the relay transmitter in the second
hop, the achievable rate at the monitor is given as
r˜
(II)
M =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
|hRM|2PR
σ2
)
. (6)
Similarly to (4), given the jamming power Q1, the eavesdrop-
ping rate at the monitor is defined as
R˜(II)eav (Q1) =
{
min (r˜R(Q1), rB) , if r˜
(II)
M ≥ min (r˜R(Q1), rB)
0, otherwise.
In practice, the monitor should adjust the jamming power
Q1 to maximize the eavesdropping rate R˜
(II)
eav (Q1). Let Qmax
denote the maximum jamming power at the monitor. The
maximum eavesdropping rate in this mode is given as
R(II)eav , max
0≤Q1≤Qmax
R˜(II)eav (Q1). (7)
Note that jamming at the maximum transmit power with Q1 =
Qmax is generally not optimal for problem (7), since this may
reduce the suspicious communication rate min (r˜R(Q1), rB)
too much and lead to over-reduced eavesdropping rate.
C. Mode (III): Proactive Eavesdropping via Hybrid Jamming
over the Second Hop
In mode (III), as shown in Fig. 1(c), the monitor uses
the hybrid jamming in the second hop to reduce the end-to-
end communication rate for helping eavesdropping in the first
hop.1 As for the suspicious communication, the achievable rate
at the relay in the first hop is equal to rR in (1) in mode (I). In
1Note that in the second hop here, we can also use noise jamming, which,
however, corresponds to a special case of the hybrid jamming and thus is not
considered separately.
the second hop, based on the amplify-and-forward principle at
the monitor, the monitor designs the hybrid jamming signal as
αˆyM1+x2, where αˆ denotes the amplifying coefficient for the
received signal yM1 =
√
PAhAMs + n3 in the first hop, and
x2 ∼ CN (0, Q2) denotes the AN in the second hop, where the
subscripts of x2 and Q2 indicate the second hop. The received
signal at Bob is denoted as
yˆB =
√
PRhRBs+ hMB(αˆyM1 + x2) + n2
= (
√
PRhRB + αˆ
√
PAhMBhAM)s+ hMBx2 + αhMBn3 + n2.
In order to most efficiently jam the Bob receiver, the monitor
designs αˆ as αˆ = − hRBh
†
AM
h
†
MB
|hRBh
†
AM
h
†
MB
|
α, where the superscript †
denotes the complex conjugate operation, and α ≥ 0 denotes
the magnitude of αˆ. This design makes the forwarded message
αˆ
√
PAhMBhAMs from the monitor being destructively com-
bined with
√
PRhRBs from Alice at the Bob receiver, thus
maximally reducing its SINR and achievable rate, which are
respectively given as
γˆB(α,Q2) =
|√PRhRB − α
√
PAhAMhMB|2
|hMB|2Q2 + α2|hMB|2σ2 + σ2 ,
rˆB(α,Q2) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
|√PRhRB − α
√
PAhAMhMB|2
|hMB|2Q2 + α2|hMB|2σ2 + σ2
)
.
(8)
By combining (1) and (8), the end-to-end suspicious commu-
nication rate is min (rR, rˆB(α,Q2)).
The half-duplex monitor can only overhear the suspicious
message in the first hop. In this case, the received SNR at
the monitor is γˆ
(III)
M =
|hAM|
2PA
σ2
, and the achievable rate is
rˆ
(III)
M =
1
2 log2
(
1 + |hAM|
2PA
σ2
)
. Similarly to (4) and under
given α and Q2, the eavesdropping rate is expressed as
Rˆ(III)eav (α,Q2)
=
{
min (rR, rˆB(α,Q2)) , if rˆ
(III)
M ≥ min (rR, rˆB(α,Q2))
0, otherwise.
The monitor should jointly adjust α and Q2 to maximize
the eavesdropping rate Rˆ
(III)
eav (α,Q2). Note that the jamming
power at the monitor is E(|αyM1 + x2|2) = α2PA|hAM|2 +
α2σ2 +Q2, which cannot exceed the maximum value Qmax.
Here, E(·) denotes the statistical expectation. Under this power
constraint, the maximum eavesdropping rate in this mode is
given as
R(III)eav , max
α≥0,Q2≥0
Rˆ(III)eav (α,Q2) (9)
s.t. α2PA|hAM|2 + α2σ2 +Q2 ≤ Qmax. (10)
Problem (9) will be solved later by determining α and Q2
to balance between the message forwarding to reduce the
received signal strength at the SINR numerator versus the AN
to increase the interference power at the SINR denominator.
III. JOINT EAVESDROPPING-MODE SELECTION AND
JAMMING POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, we first obtain the maximum eavesdropping
rate at the monitor under each individual eavesdropping mode,
and then select the best one among them. As R
(I)
eav for mode (I)
is a constant term, we only need to find R
(II)
eav and R
(III)
eav
for modes (II) and (III) by solving problems (7) and (9),
respectively.
A. Optimal Noise Jamming Power for Mode (II)
First, we solve problem (7) to obtain R
(II)
eav in mode (II). In
the case when the achievable rate rR at the relay is larger than
rM at the monitor, the jamming power is denoted by
Q˜1 = max
(
(|hAR|2PA − |hRM|2PR)σ2
|hMR|2|hRM|2PR , 0
)
(11)
such that r˜R(Q˜1) at the relay is reduced to be equal to r˜
(II)
M in
(6). We can then easily obtain the optimal solution to problem
(7) in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1: The optimal noise jamming power to prob-
lem (7) is given as
Q⋆1 =
{
Q˜1, if r˜
(II)
M < min (rR, rB) and Qmax ≥ Q˜1,
0, otherwise,
where Q˜1 is given in (11). The corresponding maximum
eavesdropping rate is
R(II)eav =

min (rR, rB) , if r˜
(II)
M ≥ min (rR, rB) ,
r˜
(II)
M , if r˜
(II)
M < min (rR, rB) and Qmax ≥ Q˜1,
0, otherwise.
This proposition can be intuitively explained by considering
two cases. First, when r˜
(II)
M ≥ min (rR, rB), the monitor can
successfully eavesdrop the suspicious message in the second
hop even without any jamming, and thus we have Q⋆1 = 0
and R
(II)
eav = min (rR, rB). Next, when r˜
(II)
M < min (rR, rB),
a minimum jamming power Q˜1 is required for successful
eavesdropping. In this case, if Q˜1 ≤ Qmax, we have Q⋆1 = Q˜1
and R
(II)
eav = r˜
(II)
M ; otherwise, we have Q
⋆
1 = 0 and the
eavesdropping is unsuccessful with R
(II)
eav = 0.
B. Optimal Hybrid Jamming Design for Mode (III)
Next, we solve problem (9) to obtain R
(III)
eav in mode (III).
To facilitate the derivation, we first obtain the minimum
achievable rate (8) at Bob under the hybrid jamming, by jointly
optimizing α and Q2, i.e.,
rˆminB = min
α,Q2≥0
rˆB(α,Q2) (12)
s.t. (10).
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1: The optimal solution to problem (12) is given
as
α = min
(√
Qmax
PA|hAM|2 + σ2
,
PR|hRB|
PA|hAM||hMB|
)
, (13)
Q2 = Qmax − (PA|hAM|2 + σ2)α2. (14)
The minimum achievable rate at Bob is rˆminB = rˆB(α,Q2).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Based on Lemma 3.1, it follows that if rˆminB ≤ rˆ(III)M , then
the monitor is able to jam the Bob receiver for successful
eavesdropping. In particular, let α and Q
2
denote the ampli-
fying coefficient and the AN power such that the achievable
rate rˆB(α,Q2) at Bob is reduced to be equal to rˆ
(III)
M , i.e.,
rˆB(α,Q2) = rˆ
(III)
M . Here, α and Q2 are generally non-unique,
and can be obtained numerically. We then have the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.2: The optimal solution α⋆ and Q⋆2 to prob-
lem (9) and the achieved maximum eavesdropping rate R
(III)
eav
are given as follows:
1) When rˆ
(III)
M ≥ min (rR, rB), the monitor can eavesdrop
the suspicious message in the first hop without jamming;
in this case, the monitor should eavesdrop passively with
α⋆ = 0, Q⋆2 = 0, and R
(III)
eav = min (rR, rB).
2) When rˆ
(III)
M < min (rR, rB) and rˆ
min
B ≤ rˆ(III)M , the
monitor can eavesdrop successfully with hybrid jamming.
In this case, the monitor should choose α⋆ = α and
Q⋆2 = Q2, and we have R
(III)
eav = rˆ
(III)
M ;
3) Otherwise, the monitor cannot eavesdrop even with jam-
ming at the maximum power; in this case, we have
α⋆ = 0, Q⋆2 = 0, and R
(III)
eav = 0.
C. Eavesdropping Mode Selection
After deriving the achievable eavesdropping rates R
(i)
eav’s
for the three modes, we next employ the eavesdropping
mode selection to choose the best mode with the highest
eavesdropping rate, i.e., the selected mode is
i⋆ = arg max
i∈{I,II,III}
R(i)eav. (15)
To provide more engineering insights, we provide intuitive
discussions on the selected mode by considering two general
cases under fixed channels with path-loss considered only.
First, consider that the monitor is near Alice or the relay, such
that the achievable rate r
(I)
M with the MRC at the monitor is
no smaller than the end-to-end suspicious communication rate
min(rR, rB), i.e., r
(I)
M ≥ min(rR, rB). In this case, passive
eavesdropping is able to eavesdrop successfully, and thus is
preferred.
Next, when the monitor is far away from both Alice and
the relay such that r
(I)
M < min (rR, rB), passive eavesdropping
is infeasible, and proactive eavesdropping is necessary. In this
case, if the monitor is closer to Alice than the relay, mode (III)
performs better than mode (II) by overhearing from the nearer
node Alice more clearly; and vice versa. When the monitor is
too far away from both Alice and the relay but relatively close
to Bob, mode (III) is the only feasible eavesdropping mode
by jamming Bob effectively (see Fig. 2 in Section IV).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to validate
the performance of our proposed design. In the simulation,
suppose that Alice, the relay, and Bob are located in a
line with the x-y coordinates being (0, 0), (500 meters, 0),
(1000 meters, 0), respectively. We set the transmit powers at
Alice and the relay as PA = PR = 40 dBm, the jamming
power at the monitor as Qmax = 50 dBm, and the noise power
as σ2 = 80 dBm, respectively.
Fig. 2 shows the selection region for different eavesdropping
modes under AWGN channels. Here, we set the channel power
x(m)
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Fig. 2. Optimal eavesdropping modes of the monitor at different locations in
AWGN channel, where only the locations with positive eavesdropping rates
are shown.
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Fig. 3. The average eavesdropping rate versus the monitor’s horizontal
location in fading channels.
gains based on the path-loss model κ
(
d
d0
)−ζ
, where κ =
−60 dB corresponds to the path-loss at the reference distance
d0 = 10 meters, and ζ = 3. It is observed that the selected
eavesdropping modes under different scenarios are consistent
with our discussion in Section III-C.
Fig. 3 shows the average eavesdropping rate versus the x-
axis of the monitor’s location in the Rayleigh fading channel
case, where the results are averaged over 104 random realiza-
tions and the monitor’s y-axis location is fixed as 500 meters.
It is observed that due to the averaging over various random
channel realizations, our proposed design with optimal eaves-
dropping mode selection is observed to achieve significantly
improved average eavesdropping rate as compared to each
individual eavesdropping mode.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the wireless surveillance of a two-hop
suspicious communication link via a half-duplex legitimate
monitor. By exploring the suspicious link’s two-hop nature,
the monitor can either combine two copies of the suspicious
message in both hops to improve the passive eavesdropping
performance, or implement noise jamming or hybrid jamming
for efficient proactive eavesdropping. We proposed joint eaves-
dropping mode selection and jamming power allocation to
maximize the eavesdropping rate at the monitor. We hope
that this new design can provide insights on the wireless
surveillance design by taking advantage of multi-hop suspi-
cious communication systems.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1
Solving problem (12) is equivalent to finding the minimum
SINR at Bob, i.e.,
γˆminB = min
α≥0,Q2≥0
γˆB(α,Q2) (16)
s.t. (10).
It is evident that for problem (16), the optimality is attained
when the jamming power at the monitor is used up, i.e., the
power constraint in (10) is tight. As a result, we have
Q2 = Qmax − (PA|hAM|2 + σ2)α2. (17)
By substituting (17), problem (16) can be reformulated as
γˆminB = min
α
(
√
PR|hRB| − α
√
PA|hAMhMB|)2
σ2 − α2PA|hAM|2|hMB|2 +Qmax|hMB|2
s.t. 0 ≤ α ≤
√
Qmax
PA|hAM|2 + σ2 . (18)
By examining the first-order derivative of the objective func-
tion in problem (18), its optimal solution can be obtained as
α in (13). By substituting this into (17), we have Q2 in (14).
Therefore, this lemma is proved.
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